An interesting point about Genya's response is that it essentially is a form of logical positivism. The question asked, "If Chase is right and we can't know anything for sure, why do we nonetheless continue to act as though we can?" is answered with a supposed 'scientific' answer--an appeal to cognitive science. However, the question still remains--how can you know that for sure? The reason why I say that Genya's response is in correspondence to logical positivism is that Genya is attempting to put philosophical questions into entirely scientific terms that are supposedly "objective" enough for all of us to accept and which are subject to the criterion of verifiability.
Yet, this viewpoint, as I mentioned earlier, disregards the knower of the information--who must view all of the words that Genya wrote as relating to a system of ideas that then render the reader capable of reconstructing an interpretation of what Genya wrote.
At this point, though, I have run into irony twice. Firstly, I am writing this as if there was objectivity to my viewpoint and referring to a piece of writing that I saw as being available to anyone who might read this--which, according to my piece, is meaningless. Secondly, this piece and Genya's piece both defend the position that people have bias and that any theory of knowledge must recognize this--yet, the initial premise of my piece is denying Genya's "scientific" rigor. What this means is, my piece contradicts itself, while it also both critiques and defends Genya's position (with the same argument).
Furthermore, I would like to state that the apparent contradictions that is brought into a system of knowledge when we communicate (writing a comment, speak a sentence, etc.) lends further credence to the proposition held by many in the class that people pragmatically don't consider all the implications of their actions, cogitations, observations, rationalizations, or what have you.
I think the essential point that we can uncover from this discussion is that people actually don't answer all the philosophical questions necessary to analyze and comprehend everything related to anything they do. Questions such as: "How do we know this?", "Why do we act as such?","Where does meaning reside?", etc. are also "uncovered" (or maybe "artificially constructed" concepts

!) when, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the philosophical bands which have connected them with another, and to question, among the ideas of the earth, the assumptions that lead to all sorts of inconsistencies, absurdities and other points of both joy and sorrow.
In the present case, all of us, I'm 100% certain, have come across times where we believed something to be true, only to find out that, in fact, we were wrong. These sorts of cases cause us to look at all of our convictions and try to find a system either by which we can describe the concepts that relate to this all-too-common phenomena.
Interestingly enough, I believe this commentary opens up a new question, "What does communication mean if neither party can be sure they know anything?" "Does communication itself presuppose knowledge?"
The original question that we were answering is simply absurd because on some level it is already answered because we are writing a response. In order to write the response we must have already made the pragmatic assumption of having some degree of knowledge because we put what we thought we know into words. Therefore, any attempt at responding to the question of why we make that assumption is a mere speculation on the assumption that is currently being enacted and must be enacted in order to answer the question. The tangling of the assumption with our analysis of the assumption simply means that laguage itself is tied into that assumption, as is any analysis. This assumption is a nexus that relates to all propositions and renders them all within a single system.
Perhaps if there is any certainty of existence then we can be certain of the assumption that we know something.